Credit ratings play an important role in the fixed income market as the entire regulatory framework of this market segment is based on them and a significant part of what investors can and cannot do is dictated by ratings. Also, a number of ratings-based metrics are employed globally to estimate capital reserves, liquidity buffers, and solvency standards for many institutional investors such as insurance companies and pension funds. A critical assumption at the root of this regulatory architecture is that the credit-rating scales of the three leading agencies (Moody's, Fitch, and Standard & Poor's) are completely equivalent.
Introduction
Credit ratings play a significant role in the fixed income markets. The main reason is that ratings remain entrenched in the regulatory framework of the U.S., the U.K., the Eurozone, and throughout Asia and Latin America. In fact, to a large extent, ratings dictate what many institutional investors such as insurance companies and pension funds can and cannot buy. Additionally, ratings influence many risk managementrelated metrics, determine which assets can be used as collateral in many two-party transactions, and affect the liquidity and price of the securities that are downgraded. Moreover, less sophisticated investors still rely on ratings as a guiding benchmark to make investment decisions. Also, credit ratings' downgrades, especially when they reach the below-investment grade area, can force investors to sell their holdings under unfavorable market conditions. Accordingly, credit ratings have an extraordinary power to influence the dynamics of all segments of the bond markets: corporate, sovereign, and structured products.
The credit rating agencies −notwithstanding the setback to their reputation they suffered after the subprime crisis− still enjoy a strong oligopoly power. Moody's, Standard & Poor's (S&P), and FitchRatings (Fitch) command in aggregate a market share that exceeds 95% of the global ratings market (Matthies 2013 ). There are probably many reasons behind this situation. One of the reasons is that regulators in both, the U.S. and Europe -perhaps afraid of creating more havoc in the aftermath of the subprime crisis-decided not to pursue any serious actions against the rating agencies after the subprime crisis. This is in clear contrast, for example, with the Enron scandal which resulted in Arthur Andersen surrendering its license and ceasing to exist. Another reason is that regulators have maintained huge barriers to entry which obviously have protected the established players. Consider the case of the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), which controls access to the American market by virtue of designating which organizations can qualify as Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating Organizations (NRSRO). To obtain the desirable NRSRO status, a firm must prove −among other things− that it has been in the business of issuing paid ratings and selling them to an established group of clients for at least three years before being able to apply for such status. This requisite presents a difficult obstacle to overcome for a potential newcomer for it must find a market for a product (a rating) that has yet to be officially sanctioned.
With this background, it is not surprising that credit ratings have received an increasing amount of attention from the academic environment. Previous research has addressed a number of issues. Given that credit ratings are supposed to reflect the degree of creditworthiness of an issuer, many studies have investigated if ratings indeed capture this feature and results have shown that over several-year periods credit ratings correlate well with observed default rates. However, in shorter (one-year) periods, ratings are a less reliable predictor of default (Zhou 2001; Jorion and Zhang 2007) .
Several authors have explored the capacity of credit ratings to influence market movements. They have concluded that ratings decisions, especially downgrades, influence prices and liquidity. They have speculated that the main reason is that fixed income markets are not very efficient and credit ratings, despite their shortcomings, convey some information that is not readily available to all investors (Gonzales et al. 2004 ). Fabozzi and Vink (2015) , in the context of European mortgages, established that investors place some value on ratings as they penalize transactions in which the three agencies give different ratings to the same tranches.
Other researchers have attempted to identify the factors that determine credit ratings. In principle, credit ratings should capture quantitative factors such as financial ratios, combined with qualitative factors such as macroeconomic drivers and corporate governance elements. The relationship between certain metrics (long-term debt, interest coverage ratios, as well as their evolution over time) and creditworthiness has been well-established. Nevertheless, how to properly combine these quantitative metrics with qualitative factors to estimate credit ratings is still an area with many unresolved issues (Altman 1968; Carling et al. 2007; Kamstra et al. 2001) .
Scholars have examined the stability of ratings over time and through the business cycle, as well as the transition-probability matrices, that is, the likelihood that a given rating could change to a different category during a specific time-frame, typically, one year (Amato and Furfine 2004; Kim and Sohn 2008; Loffler 2004 Loffler , 2005 . It should be noted that most research has focused on corporate ratings, and less emphasis has been given to sovereign ratings and structured products. Matthies (2013) has provided the best survey of previous credit ratings-related empirical research.
However, what is really surprising is that except for a recent report by Ghosh (2013) nobody has studied the degree of agreement (or disagreement) among the corporate ratings provided by the three leading agencies. In other words, the assumption that the rating categories used by the three leading agencies are equivalent has been accepted without question by regulators, politicians, and naïve investors.
At this point, it is necessary to introduce a few facts regarding the ratings scales and their meaning:
[1] S&P and Fitch give ratings or opinions regarding the creditworthiness of an issuer based on a default probability (P) criterion, i.e., the likelihood that the issuer might not be able to pay its future obligations.
Moody's claims that its ratings are based on the concept of expected loss (EL); that is, they take into account both, the default probability and the loss given default (LGD) or, alternatively, the recovery rate or market value of the defaulted security. Based on these considerations, one should expect some degree of divergence between the ratings given by Moody's and the other two agencies, especially for securities associated with very low or very high recoveries.
[2] Fitch and S&P use the same symbols to designate their rating categories (AAA, AA, A, etc.), whereas Moody's uses a slightly different notation (Aaa, Aa, A, etc.). For the purpose of this study we will consider seventeen rating categories. Table 1 shows the ratings scales in detail.
[3] These scales are ordinal as their categories are not equally spaced. Although the agencies have stated clearly that their scales reflect decreasing levels of creditworthiness, they have been reluctant to specify precise cutoff points (either in terms of P or EL) between the rating categories. The empirical evidence (observed default rates by categories) indicates that the overall trend is consistent: lower ratings correspond to higher default rates (see Table 1 ). However, there are some anomalies, for instance, securities rated AAby Fitch have performed better than those rated AA, and Baa1-rated bonds by Moody's have experienced lower defaults that those with a A2 rating. Also, a visual inspection of the observed default rates by category seems to indicate that the existence of a one-to-one correspondence among categories is not apparent.
[4] Regulators, and to a less extent investors, implicitly assume that there is a solid one-to-one equivalence between the rating categories of the different agencies. For example, the definition of investment grade (essentially, the level above which institutional investors are allowed to buy securities) means either having a BBB-rating or a Baa3 rating. In other words, the assumption is that a BBB-by S&P, a BBB-by Fitch, and a Baa3 by Moody's, have all the same meaning. Another case in point, typically, bonds with ratings of either Aa3 or AA-(by either S&P or Fitch) are assigned always the same haircut value in tables dealing with fixed income securities held as collateral.
For all practical purposes, it has been assumed that the three credit ratings scales are equivalent in the sense that they convey the same amount and type of information. Consequently, a violation of this assumption would have far reaching implications for it would weaken the conceptual foundation of much of the regulation of an important segment of the capital markets.
To our knowledge, the only study that has challenged the notion of ratings equivalence is a recent report by Ghosh (2013) . The author investigated the differences between corporate ratings issued by Moody's and S&P in the U.S. market. He considered the companies in the Russell 3000 index that had been rated by both, S&P and Moody's. The study considered six specific dates in the 2006-2012 timeframe and concluded that Moody's ratings were consistently lower that S&P's. Somehow contrary to expectations, the author found that in industries that normally enjoy high and low recovery rates, the ratings differences were minimal.
The focus of our study is the equivalence among credit ratings in the Mexican fixed income market by all three agencies. Leaving aside that no such study has been conducted before, the Mexican market presents several interesting features. First, it is the most developed fixed income market in Latin America. Second, Mexico has carried out many market-liberalization reforms aimed at establishing a free-market economy, albeit with some setbacks. And third, its economy (2013 GDP = US$ 2 trillion at PPP) is poised to soon overtake Brazil as the largest in Latin America. Finally, Mexico, which has been an investment grade country since 2002 and a member of the OECD since 1994 (the first Latin American country to join this exclusive organization) is a good emerging market success story. All these considerations make it relevant to explore the ratings-equivalence conundrum in this market. The number of corporate bond issuances in the period 1994-2012 (counting based on CUSIP numbers obtained from the Bloomberg database) was 1,015. In terms of 2010 US dollars, these issues amount to a total of US$ 297.3 billion. Of these 1,015 issuances, 861 (85%) were rated by at least one of the three leading agencies. In terms of dollar volume, the percentage rated at issuance was 97.2%.
Of the 1,015 issuances, 376 were in local currency (37%); whereas in volume, the local currency issuance was only 2.1% (slightly more than US$ 6 billion). Foreign currency bond issuances were dominated by US dollars (93%), followed by Euros (4%). It can be seen that no agency dominates any particular market segment, except for Moody's that enjoys a much higher fraction of the financial sector. Also, the number of new issuances has grown more or less steadily since 2002 (the year Mexico became investment grade according to all three agencies) and the subprime crisis (2008) made only a small dent in the issuance volume.
In the Mexican bond market, as is typically the case in most fixed income markets, credit ratings play an important role in the regulatory architecture of this market segment 2 . For instance, the capital requirement rules stated by the Comisión Nacional Bancaria y de Valores (the equivalent of the SEC in the U.S.) which affect banks, savings and loans institutions, and economic development institutions, are all based (when it comes to credit-related instruments) on credit ratings. Moreover, the numerous tables imbedded in the text of the relevant documents make explicit the ratings-equivalence assumption already mentioned. A similar situation occurs in the regulatory norms stated by the Comisión Nacional de Seguros y Fianzas (the insurance regulator) in relation to admissible investments and counterparty risks. Also, the investment guidelines for the AFORES (the institutions that manage the pension funds) are structured around limits based on credit ratings. (The AFORES, whose assets under management are equivalent to almost 15% of the Mexican GDP, have more than 90% of their funds invested in rated debt instruments.) Finally, with
Mexico making important advances to adopt Basel III and Solvency II standards, which rely both on credit ratings for an important part of their solvency and liquidity rules, the relevance of exploring the validity of the ratings-equivalence hypothesis is paramount.
The data
Our data are based on corporate ratings, at issuance, as reported by Bloomberg. We focus on the 1994-2012 period. The advantage of restricting the study to at-issuance ratings (as opposed to analyzing all the ratings at some specific time point) is that it makes for a clean comparison. In fact, it eliminates the possibility that any observed discrepancy could be attributed -at least potentially-to different standards of attention in terms of monitoring existing ratings. Or the possibility that one rating agency (a stricter agency) might lead in terms of downgrading an issuer, which, in turn, might encourage the other agencies to alter their ratings not to appear as more benevolent. In other words, focusing on ratings released simultaneously and with access to the same information, assures us that whatever discrepancy is detected it will be only the result of applying different criteria to the same evidence. Table 3 describes the data from the three rating agencies: Moody's, S&P, and Fitch. We have collapsed all the observations with the CCC, CC, C and D (S&P and Fitch nomenclature) designation into one category simply because the agencies tend to report the data for these categories in aggregate terms. Rating agencies make little or almost no difference between, for example, a CCC-rated bond and a C-rated bond.
Additionally, although strictly speaking these scales are ordinal, we have assigned a numeric rank of 1, 2, etc. to each category to facilitate comparisons.
Analysis and discussion
Let us first emphasize that the rating scales are just ordered categories, and therefore, an average ranking is not a meaningful concept. Notwithstanding this caveat, a warning is appropriate: a naïve inspection of Table 3 might be interpreted as an indication that the three agencies give similar ratings and therefore, their scales are equivalent. After all, 10.23, 10.82 and 11.44 (the average numerical rankings) do not seem that different. This conclusion, as we will see shortly, could be misleading.
Before we continue, we need to specify what we mean when we talk about the ratings being equivalent since this is not a term of art. In principle, there are several criteria (tests) that can be used to address this question, and each criterion illuminates a different aspect of what "equivalent" could mean. In this study,
we employ three such criteria: (i) inter-rater reliability; (ii) inter-rater agreement; and (iii) differences of rankings in paired-observations.
In this context, each rating agency is considered to be an independent judge. This assumption is probably reasonable as we are dealing with three ratings that are issued simultaneously and with no interchange of information among the judges. On the other hand, the judges (rating agencies) are not single individuals, but a group of individuals (rating committees) whose composition obviously changes over time. This effect, however, is mitigated by the fact that these individuals follow certain established ratings criteria which give stability and continuity to the rating process.
Inter-rater reliability
This concept (which is often confused with inter-rater agreement) refers to the degree to which ratings produced by different judges are identical when expressed as deviations from their means. Or, alternatively, it means the degree to which the order relationship implied by the ratings of one judge is analogous to the order relationship implied by the ratings of a second judge (regardless of the numerical value assigned to the ratings).
The inter-rater reliability can be examined using the RSF coefficient (Shrout and Fleiss, 1979) which is defined as
where the analysis involves using the standard two-way ANOVA procedure given the assumption of no interaction between issuances and judges (rating agencies), to compute the mean square for issuances (MSIS) and the mean square for error (MSe). These components are then inserted into the standard equation for reliability, and K = the number of agencies rating each issuance.
Values closer to 1 indicate a high degree of reliability whereas values closer to 0 show the opposite. Table   4 displays the RSF values for all three possible comparisons. Clearly, we have a high degree of reliability.
This means that the ordinal relationships implied by the ratings of the three agencies are very similar. In other words, if we just want to know how three bonds -X, Y and Z-are ranked, based on their creditworthiness, we should be indifferent in terms of which rating agency must be used.
Inter-rater agreement
This concept refers to the degree to which two judges or agencies, tend to assign the same ratings, to each one of the issuers considered. Thus, inter-rater agreement captures also the differences between the ratings assigned. Inter-rater agreement can be tested by means of the TTW-index coefficient (Tinsley and Weiss, 1975) which is defined as
where Na = the number of agreements, N = the number of issuances rated, and ρc = the probability of chance agreement on an issuance. Positive (negative) values are associated with levels of agreement which are higher (lower) than the agreement one could have obtained simply by chance. Table 5 shows the T-index values for three comparisons among the rating agencies.
The first and second panel define agreement in reference to the 17-rating categories specified in Table 1 .
Agreement, in the first panel, means having exactly the same rating (0 points of discrepancy). In the second panel, we consider a slightly more relaxed version of agreement, 0 or 1 points of discrepancy, except for ratings categories 10 and 11 (BBB-and BB+) where a 0 point agreement is required. The reason is that the BBB-/BB+ boundary marks the difference between investment grade and speculative bonds: a critical distinction for bond investors and regulators.
The third panel defines agreement as a 0 point difference but in reference to the broader 7-rating categories (AAA, AA, A, BBB, etc.) that is, we collapse, for example, the BBB+, BBB and BBB-rated bonds in one category; the same for the AA+, AA and AA-, and so on.
The TTW-values suggest a degree of inter-rater agreement which is higher than chance, but still low-tomoderate. As expected, the second and third panels indicate higher inter-rater agreements which are obviously consistent with the more relaxed definitions of agreement employed. An interesting feature is that the agreement between S&P and Fitch is always higher than the agreement between Moody's and either S&P or Fitch. This situation is more salient (and more telling) in the first panel. This can be attributed to the fact that Moody's bases its ratings on the EL concept whereas its competitors rely on the P concept. In essence, Moody's employs a different benchmark than its competitors to estimate ratings.
A direct consequence of this low-to-moderate agreement is that if we were interested in inferring -for example-what is the default probability of a given bond, based on its rating, we would arrive at a fairly different conclusion based on the rating agency employed. See Table 1 . Based on historic performance, a bond rated Aa3-by Moody's might suggest that its 10-year default rate could be 1.08%; however a Fitch or S&P AA-rating, might suggest different estimates: 0.21 and 0.79% respectively. This type of inter-rater disagreement is critical for it creates the opportunity for regulatory arbitrage, i.e., ratings from different agencies do not have identical numerical attributes.
Ranking differences in paired-observations
The idea here is to investigate whether the median difference between paired-observations (ratings) is zero (null hypothesis) using the Wilcoxon matched-pairs signed-ranks test (Wilcoxon, 1945 Let dj denote the difference for any matched pair of observations, dj = x1j − x2j for j = 1, 2, . . . , n; and let
Nr be the reduced sample size after excluding the pairs where |x1j -x2j| = 0. The Wilcoxon matched-pairs signed-ranks test statistic is defined as
where Rj = sgn(dj) rank(|dj |).
We analyze the aggregate data in each case and also perform comparisons by industry sectors as well as issuance-size in U.S. dollars. Notice that since the rating scales are ordinal (ranked data) −not interval, i.e., with equally spaced ordered categories− a comparison using a parametric paired differences t-test would be inappropriate.
Tables 6.1 and 6.3 show (see bottom right corner) that overall Moody's and S&P ratings as well as S&P and Fitch ratings are not equivalent (they show disagreement). The comparison between Moody's and Fitch (Table 6. 2), at the aggregate level, shows no significant difference between the two ratings scales distributions. However, looking in more detail, we appreciate that the discrepancies between the ratings distributions are more noticeable when associated with large-size issuances. In fact, in all three comparisons, we notice that for issuances larger than US$ 200 million (which amount for more than 60%
of the total volume) we see significant discrepancies (see the corresponding signed-rank score). Also, in all three cases, in the smallest issuance-size segment (less than US$ 20 million), the differences are not significant. This situation might be the result of having a small number observations in this segment.
In principle, we could have expected a high level of agreement between S&P and Fitch, since both give ratings based on the same concept: default probability. We also considered those instances where ratings by all three rating agencies were available. Follow-up pairwise comparisons were conducted using, again, the Wilcoxon signed-rank tests as indicated in Table 7 . The results are consistent with those reported in Tables 6.1, 6.2 and 6.3. We also conducted a non-parametric Friedman test of differences among the rankings given by the three rating agencies. The differences among the rankings are statistically significant. The test is significant χ 2 (2, N = 308) = 50.21, p < .0001 for the ratings at issuance.
Considering that Mexico became an investment-grade country in 2002, it makes sense to look at the dataset by dividing it in two groups: (i) before, and (ii) after such event. Table 8 shows the results of the three pairwise comparisons, for both time periods. In the 2003−2012 period all three comparisons are significant.
Not only that, they show the same tendencies (gap signs) as the results displayed in Tables 6.1, 6.2 and 6.3.
In the period 1994−2002 the differences are also significant. There is, however, a noticeable fact. While S&P and Fitch maintained the same type of discrepancy, before and after 2002, (namely, S&P gave lower ratings) the opposite happens between Moody's and its two competitors. More precisely, initially Moody's tended to give lower ratings than both Fitch and S&P, but apparently during the second period, there was a ratings' standards changed and the opposite is observed. One could have suspected that the Moody's-Fitch discrepancy was weak based on the results reported in Table 6 .2. But, as the results in Table 8 indicate, this is not the case. They suggest that Moody's possibly changed standards after 2002, and went from more severe to more lenient (note the change in sign in the gap). Thus, one can speculate that the difference between Moody's and its competitors might appear mitigated when analyzing the entire dataset (1994) (1995) (1996) (1997) (1998) (1999) (2000) (2001) (2002) (2003) (2004) (2005) (2006) (2007) (2008) (2009) (2010) (2011) (2012) simply because the discrepancies before and after 2002 might be "cancelling out."
In summary, although the ratings by the three agencies exhibit a high level of reliability, the inter-rater agreement and the Wilcoxon test indicate that the three rating agencies give ratings that cannot be considered to be equivalent as their respective distributions are dissimilar. Furthermore, our analyses suggest that S&P is consistently stricter than both Moody's and Fitch.
Conclusions
Two conclusions emerge from this study. First, the bad news: the lack of inter-rater agreement, coupled with the discrepancies detected by the Wilcoxon matched-pair test, raises some issues regarding the suitability of ratings for regulatory purposes. Notice that the entire fixed income regulatory framework in
Mexico is based on the ratings-equivalence assumption. For example, rules such as, "cannot invest in any assets with a rating below Baa3/BBB-", or, "can only hold AAA/Aaa assets" and the like, are at the core of the country's current regulation. Violation of the ratings-equivalence assumption undermines the validity of such statements. Moreover, it encourages regulatory arbitrage, and introduces distortions that might affect the risk metrics employed to assess the solvency and liquidity of key financial institutions.
The good news is the high inter-rater reliability. This means that any ratings scale (Fitch, S&P or
Moody's) is essentially identical if we just need to rank a group of bonds by creditworthiness. This is useful for an investor who needs to decide between any two bonds based on credit risk only.
The lack of inter-rater agreement to some extent should not be surprising. Not only S&P and Fitch use a criterion (P) that is different than that employed by Moody's (EL); but also, the consistency over time of rating committees (group of individuals whose composition vary) might increase the likelihood of disagreement.
One potential solution to this situation is to rethink the fundamentals of the regulatory framework and consider the possibility that the regulator might specify a well-defined ratings scale, independent of the agencies themselves. For example, a 17-category scale specified by clearly defined cutoff points based on different P (or EL) levels. In this case, the agencies should only limit themselves to issue an opinion regarding which of the categories should be assigned to a new bond issuance. This topic is clearly beyond the scope of the present study.
In case these findings turned out to be a feature not only of the Mexican market, but a general feature of the global fixed income markets, the consequences could be more unsettling. There is reason to believe that such could be the case. The recent study by Ghosh (2013) regarding the U.S. market, although it only considered ratings of companies listed in the Russell 3000 index, is revealing. This author examined only S&P and Moody's ratings and concluded that there were significant discrepancies between both agencies. At present, we are investigating if our findings regarding the Mexican market hold true in the broad U.S. fixed income market. *Rating categories were assigned a numerical rank from 1 to 17 in ascending order; the rating category AAA/Aaa was assigned the lowest ranking and the rating categories CCC+/Caa1 through D/C were assigned the highest ranking. 
